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1291 
Contracting Trademark Fame? 
Leah Chan Grinvald 
Contracts abound in today’s highly digitized society.  Did you snap a 
pic and upload it to Instagram?  You entered into a contract.  Did you 
check your friends’ statuses on Facebook?  Yep, you also entered into a 
contract.  Did you know you entered into a contract or even if you were 
aware of this fact, did you know the terms to which you agreed?  
Probably not.  But despite this, we are all obligated by these contracts, 
so long as we are somehow made aware that we could read the terms at 
some point if we had the inclination to do so.  Online companies are 
rationally taking advantage of this, and are inserting clauses into the 
online agreements we enter into with them that place them in better 
legal positions.  These clauses range from waiver of legal rights, choice 
of law and forum selection for disputes, and restrictions on intellectual 
property rights.  Even though we are likely not aware of these clauses 
until well after we have agreed to them, courts typically uphold their 
binding nature based on an objective theory of contract law.  Although 
scholars and commentators have raised numerous concerns related to 
the application of this theory to online contracting, I am concerned with 
an avenue that has not yet been explored: the possible extension of this 
theory to trademark law. 
The reason this concern exists lies in the doctrine of trademark fame 
and developments in the use of online agreements to have all of the 
website’s claimed trademarks recognized by its website users.  Fame is 
the gold standard in trademark law, which enables a trademark holder 
to control almost anything that anyone else does with the famous mark.  
Yet, fame is extremely hard to prove and requires strong evidence of 
consumer recognition and commercial strength.  Due to this, some 
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trademark holders may be turning to newer forms of evidence, such as 
website agreements to potentially bolster claims of fame.  Given the 
large number of users of some of these websites (for example, Facebook 
has over one billion worldwide users), if the objective theory of contract 
law were imported (even subconsciously) into the trademark realm, it 
would seem to be an easy argument that “Face” and “Book” are 
separately famous trademarks.  As such, some trademark holders would 
be given virtually limitless control over all terms incorporating these 
generic or merely descriptive words.  I question whether the 
importation of this contract law theory into trademark law would be a 
normatively positive development and conclude that it should not be.  
Yet, because the utilization of online agreements are a tempting shortcut 
for difficult decisions regarding trademark fame, I offer some ideas to 
resolve the problems of using such contracts in trademark litigation, 
including adopting an interactive theory of trademark fame. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In today’s society, we are clicking, tapping, swiping, and browsing 
on the Internet almost every minute of the day.1  We chuckle at a 
stranger’s funny cat video upload, buy or rent the books we need to 
study with for the semester, virtually check in with our friends, and 
browse reviews on where we should spend our next spring break.  
Throughout all of this activity, we are entering into contracts with the 
online company providing us with the chuckle or sending us our books.2  
But a meager 0.65% of us are actually reading the terms of these 
agreements we have entered into.3  Despite this fact, courts routinely 
uphold these contracts as enforceable,4 even though we have agreed to 
waive legal rights,5 taken on onerous obligations,6 or agreed to 
acknowledge questionable intellectual property rights.7  The theory on 
which courts base their decisions is a staple of every first-year law 
 
1. See Average Daily Media Use in the U.S. 2014, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/ 
statistics/270781/average-daily-media-use-in-the-us/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (finding that the 
average American spends 163 minutes per day on a tablet, 159 minutes per day online on a 
desktop computer, and 134 minutes per day on a smartphone (nonvoice)). 
2. See Terms of Service, Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010), https://www.you 
tube.com/t/terms (“By using or visiting the YouTube website or any YouTube products, software, 
data feeds, and services provided to you on, from, or through the YouTube website (collectively 
the ‘Service’) you signify your agreement to (1) these terms and conditions (the ‘Terms of 
Service’) . . . .”); Conditions of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display 
.html?nodeId=508088 (last updated Feb. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Amazon TOS] (“By using 
Amazon Services, you agree to these conditions.  Please read them carefully.”). 
3. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the 
Fine Print?  Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (2014) 
(tracking online behavior of 48,154 monthly visitors to ninety different online software 
companies and finding that approximately six out of every 1000 visitors reads a fraction of the 
online agreement for the website). 
4. See Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579 (2007) (“[T]he courts have unanimously found that clicking is a 
valid way to manifest assent since the first clickwrap agreement was litigated in 1998.”); Cheryl 
B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How 
the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 30 
(2011) (“[C]ourts willing to invalidate any clickwrap are rare.”). 
5. Amazon TOS, supra note 2 (establishing a waiver of dispute resolution through trial by jury 
and requiring all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration). 
6. Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO!, https://policies.yahoo.com/us/en/yahoo/terms/utos/ 
index.htm (last updated Mar. 16, 2016) (“You agree to indemnify and hold Yahoo and its 
subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, agents, employees, partners and licensors harmless from any 
claim or demand, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, made by any third party due to or arising 
out of Content you submit, post, transmit, modify or otherwise make available through the Yahoo 
Services, your use of the Yahoo Services, your connection to the Yahoo Services, your violation 
of the TOS, or your violation of any rights of another.”). 
7. See, e.g., Amazon TOS, supra note 2 (requiring users to agree not to use Amazon’s 
trademarks or trade dress that disparages or discredits Amazon, even though the use of 
trademarks in this manner may be protected under federal law). 
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students’ contract law curriculum: the objective theory of contract law, 
or the “duty to read.”8 
Although numerous scholars and commentators have criticized the 
extension of the objective theory of contracts to online contracting,9 I 
am concerned with a further extension of this theory to intellectual 
property law.  In particular, some recent developments in online 
contracting and in trademark litigation lead to the potential of extending 
the objective theory of contract law to trademark law.  For example, 
some online companies are inserting trademark acknowledgment 
clauses in their online agreements potentially in order to prove the 
strength or fame of their trademarks.10  “Strong” or “famous” trademark 
status enhances the ability of the trademark holder to broadly control all 
third-party uses of its trademark, including in reviews, criticism, parody, 
and even in online searching.11  In short, fame has become the gold 
 
8. NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS 7 (2014) (“The courts apply an objective standard to the 
contract dealings, meaning that they will assume that the parties were reasonable people and 
believed and acted the way reasonable people believe and act.”).  See generally Charles L. Knapp, 
Is there a Duty to Read?, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART 
MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 315 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013). 
9. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 14 (2013) (“One task of this book is to think 
again about whether boilerplate should be considered contractual.  I want to urge that it should 
not, at least not in all of its manifestations.”).  See generally James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (2013) (attacking the use of boilerplate agreements and the 
objective theory of contracts based on market failure); Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the 
Aberrance of Electronic Contracts, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 275 (2014) (“The development of 
an aberrant doctrine contributed to further aberrance in both the form and the content of electronic 
agreements.”); Knapp, supra note 8, at 330 (“To speak of [online agreements that contain 
unilateral modification clauses] in terms of traditional [duty to read] principles strains that 
principle to the breaking point.”); Preston & McCann, supra note 4, at 30 (“[U]nknowing 
‘consent’ should not be acceptance of a TOS either.”). 
10. See, e.g., User Agreement, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement 
(last updated Oct. 23, 2014) [hereinafter LinkedIn TOS] (“LinkedIn reserves all of its intellectual 
property rights in the Services.  For example, LinkedIn, SlideShare, LinkedIn (stylized), the 
SlideShare and “in” logos and other LinkedIn trademarks, service marks, graphics, and logos 
used in connection with LinkedIn are trademarks or registered trademarks of LinkedIn.”); 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2013) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Facebook 2013 TOS] (“You will not use our copyrights or trademarks (including 
Facebook, the Facebook and F Logos, FB, Face, Poke, Book . . . marks), except as expressly 
permitted by our Brand Usage Guidelines or with our prior written permission.”).  In this Article, 
I use the term “fame” to encompass the entire spectrum of strength that a trademark may have 
over the course of its lifetime, ranging from acquisition of secondary meaning, to becoming a 
strong mark, and then to potentially a famous mark.  Professor McCarthy provides a “strength 
thermometer” to show this spectrum.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:75 (4th ed. 1996). 
11. See James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(“What is intended by references to ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ marks is the effect of such marks upon 
the mind of the consuming public.  A mark that is strong because of its fame or uniqueness, is 
more likely to be remembered and more likely to be associated in the public mind with a greater 
breadth of products and services than is a mark that is weak because relatively unknown or very 
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standard in trademark law to which many large multinational brands 
aspire12 and the temptation to extend the objective theory of contracting 
to this area is very real.  If courts applied this theory to these online 
agreements as evidence for fame, proving such becomes a slam dunk 
for some large companies.13 
While there might be an efficiency argument to be made about this 
type of evidence, the potential importation of the objective theory of 
contracting into trademark law deserves more attention for at least two 
reasons.  The first reason is a theoretical disconnect between contract 
law and trademark law.  The objective theory of online contracting is 
premised on an efficiency and notice rationale: online contracts are an 
efficient mechanism with which to conduct business.14  If reasonable 
notice is given, users have a duty to read under traditional contract law 
doctrine, and will be presumed to have assented to the contract if they 
continue with use of the website (even if they have never laid eyes on 
the online agreement).15  On the other hand, the goal of trademark law 
 
like similar marks or very like the name of the product.”); see also Timothy Denny Greene & Jeff 
Wilkerson, Understanding Trademark Strength, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 535, 544 (2013) (“[T]he 
stronger a mark, the wider its scope of protection and thus the more third-party uses it can block 
from the stream of commerce.”); Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known 
Marks, 13 VAND. J. ENT. TECH. L. 1, 16 (2010) (“[I]f a trademark has acquired an increased level 
of consumer recognition, the breadth of the owner’s rights expands.”). 
12. See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, Monster Fiercely Protects Its Name: Cable Products 
Company Sues Those Who Use M-Word, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 8, 2004, 4:00 AM), http://www.sf 
gate.com/bayarea/article/Monster-fiercely-protects-its-name-Cable-2675907.php (describing 
Monster Cable’s attempts at policing its trademark in order to strengthen its legal rights). 
13. To be clear, I am not arguing against the use by these entities of monthly active users to 
prove fame.  In fact, the number of monthly active users is a good proxy for consumer 
recognition—but only for those trademarks that are actually used on the website.  See infra Part 
IV.  For example, Facebook has included in prior online agreements a number of different 
trademarks that it does not use on its website, such as “Face” and “Book.”  See Facebook 2013 
TOS, supra note 10.  It has also argued in opposition proceedings at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office that it has famous trademarks not only for those marks it uses on the website, 
such as Facebook, but also for other marks it does not individually use on the website, such as 
“Face” or “Fbook.”  See Notice of Opposition, Facebook, Inc. v. facewerk, No. 91208601-OPP 
(T.T.A.B. Dec. 21, 2012), http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91208601&pty=OPP&eno=1 
(claiming fame for “Face”); Notice of Opposition, Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com LLC, No. 
91194136-OPP (T.T.A.B. Mar. 15, 2010), http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91194136& 
pty=OPP&eno=1 (claiming fame for “Fbook”).  The “Facewerk” opposition was merited, but not 
because “Face” was a famous trademark.  The applicant for “facewerk” was attempting to register 
a stylized version of “facewerk” using the same font and colors as “facebook.”  Compare U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 85/588,351 (filed Apr. 3, 2012) (“FACEWRK”), with 
FACEBOOK, Registration No. 4,396,483. 
14. KIM, supra note 8, at 26. 
15. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
Verio’s continued use of Register’s website put Verio on notice of Register’s online agreement 
and therefore it entered into an enforceable contract, even though Verio argued it had never read 
the terms). 
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(either for trademark infringement or dilution cases) is to recreate the 
reality of consumer perception.16  Courts purport to assess the actual 
reality of strength or fame, albeit through various proxies such as 
evidence of marketing and sales efforts.17  Presuming consumer 
recognition of trademarks through an implied assent to online 
agreements would substitute consumer reality with a completely 
fictitious one.  This disconnect between the two theories cautions 
against importing the objective theory of contract law into trademark 
law. 
The second reason that importing contract’s objective theory into 
trademark law would be detrimental is that it would significantly lower 
the burden of proof some trademark holders would have in proving the 
fame of their trademarks.  While this would not be problematic for truly 
famous marks, some entities, such as Amazon, Facebook, and LinkedIn 
are including (or have included) in their online agreements the 
requirement to recognize descriptive or generic terms, such as “A to Z,” 
“Book,” or “in.”18  However, if these descriptive (or potentially generic) 
terms were given “strong” or “famous” trademark status, the ability of 
some large multinational corporations to monopolize the English 
language would be limitless.  For example, if “Book” was given a 
famous trademark status, Facebook would be able to monopolize the 
online use of the term “Book” (and indeed they are attempting to do so), 
even if the use is in a descriptive or generic fashion.19 
Both of these concerns have implications that reach far beyond 
trademark law.  My concern with importing theories from one field to 
another is a broad-based one, as it is often tempting to import legal 
theories from one legal field into another.  What appears to work in one 
field may seem like a panacea in another field.  I argue that we should 
strive to prevent this from happening at an unconscious level, and 
instead, more fully examine and debate whether importation is fully 
 
16. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1645 (2006) (“The [multifactor likelihood of confusion] 
test itself is essentially a substitute for empirical work.  Ideally, a court would determine the 
likelihood of consumer confusion by taking testimony from every consumer who has been or will 
be exposed to the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks.”). 
17. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, §§ 11:83, 15:30 (citing factors); see also Graeme W. Austin, 
Trademarks and the Unburdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 831–32 (2004) (“One of 
the unusual things about trademark infringement cases is that liability most often depends on the 
state of mind of none of the parties to the litigation.  As a result, trademark law must always 
apprehend the consumer worldview at a distance.”). 
18. Amazon TOS, supra note 2 (follow link under “Trademarks”); Facebook 2013 TOS, supra 
note 10; LinkedIn TOS, supra note 10. 
19. See Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com LLC, 819 F. Supp. 2d 764, 776–77 (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
(reciting Teachbook’s argument). 
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justified.  This discussion should focus on a number of factors, 
including the theoretical “connect” between fields.  Further, my concern 
of monopolizing regular words has broad consequences for not just 
freedom of speech, but also international business competition.  If large 
entities are able to “propertize” generic and descriptive words, other 
businesses, including competitors of those large entities, will be less 
competitive.20  In fact, the anticompetitive nature of granting trademark 
protection to generic and descriptive marks has been the traditional 
justification for not granting protection at all to generic marks, and 
requiring proof of secondary meaning for descriptive ones.21  Lowering 
the hefty burden for proof of fame would eviscerate this foundational 
principle of trademark and unfair competition law.22 
The remainder of this Article will proceed in four Parts.  In the first 
Part, I will provide a brief background of the objective theory of 
contract law and its application to online agreements.  In addition, I will 
discuss how online agreements and trademarks intersect through the use 
of trademark clauses by a number of large multinational entities in their 
online agreements with their users.  Then, in Part II, I turn to trademark 
law and chart out the various benefits to having a famous trademark, as 
well as the evidentiary problems in proving such.  After laying this 
foundation, in Part III, I will examine the normative question of whether 
we should allow the importation of the objective theory of contract law 
into trademark law.  As outlined above, I will make a case against such 
importation, based on two normative grounds.  The first is that a 
disconnect between the two theories would dislodge the current 
approach in attempting to find consumer recognition in trademark law.  
Applying the objective theory to consumer recognition of trademarks 
would divorce such recognition from reality, as the objective theory 
 
20. Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 
1323 (1980); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:104 (“If every trademark could invoke the 
antidilution remedy and stop uses of all similar marks in every market and every line of trade, this 
would upset the traditional balance of fair versus free competition that is inherent in trademark 
law.”); Lisa Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 
1098–99 (2003) (“A single business should not have a monopoly on the use of common words 
that consumers use to refer generally to a product.  A business with an exclusive right to use a 
generic term as a mark has an unfair advantage if competitors cannot use the same term to 
communicate regarding their own products.”). 
21. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(“[A]ny claim to an exclusive right [to a generic mark] must be denied since this in effect would 
confer a monopoly not only of the mark but of the product by rendering a competitor unable 
effectively to name what it was endeavoring to sell.”); see also Ramsey, supra note 20, at 1098–
99. 
22. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A dilution 
injunction, by contrast to a trademark injunction, will generally sweep across broad vistas of the 
economy.”). 
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presumes recognition of contract terms, and is not based in actual 
reality.  The second is that this importation would undermine the 
traditional anticompetitive goals of requiring a heavy burden of proof 
on those trademark holders seeking famous trademark status.  By 
lowering the standards for proving fame, large entities would be able to 
monopolize large swathes of the English language, to the detriment of 
businesses, large and small, and the average consumer.  Finally, I 
propose some solutions to this issue in Part IV, including making an 
argument for an adoption of an “interactive” theory of trademarks to 
prove strength or fame of a trademark. 
I.  THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTING 
All first-year law students in the United States learn the foundational 
principles of contract formation: offer, acceptance, consideration, and 
mutual assent.23  The last requirement, mutual assent, means that the 
“parties must—at least in the abstract—share the same understanding of 
what is being offered and accepted.”24  Under classical contract law, 
courts applied a “subjective” test of mutual assent, meaning that judges 
attempted to figure out whether the contracting parties in reality shared 
the same understanding of the contract terms.25  If one of the parties 
could prove that he or she did not share the same understanding, courts 
would invalidate the contract, as seen in the famous “Peerless” case.26  
As one can imagine, this subjective approach proved unworkable and 
had the potential to wreak havoc on the reliability of contracts.  After 
all, hindsight is twenty-twenty, and if one side of the contract were able 
to argue that it truly did not share in the understanding of the other 
party, bad business decisions could be undone.  For example, in the 
Peerless case, the judge allowed the buyer of the cotton to escape 
 
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[T]he formation 
of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange 
and a consideration.”). 
24. KIM, supra note 8, at 7. 
25. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN 
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 374 (7th ed. 2012) (“Over the first three-quarters of 
the nineteenth century, English and American courts adopted a “subjective” approach to problems 
of interpretation.  Under the subjectivist view, if the parties attributed materially different 
meanings to contractual language, no contract was formed.”). 
26. Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 2 Hurl. & C. 906.  In this case, there was 
a contract for the sale of cotton, which was to arrive on the Peerless ship from Bombay.  It turned 
out that there were two Peerless ships sailing from Bombay and the seller meant to deliver the 
cotton from the second of the Peerless ships, while the buyer meant to take delivery from the first 
of the Peerless ships.  In the lawsuit brought by the seller against the buyer, the Court of 
Exchequer found in favor of the buyer, holding that “the defendant meant one ‘Peerless’ and the 
plaintiff another. . . . [T]here was no consensus ad idem, and therefore no binding contract.”  Id. 
at 376, 2 Hurl. & C. at 907. 
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liability for rejecting the shipment he had contracted to purchase 
because of the lack of his subjective mutual assent.27 
The desire to stabilize the reliability of contracting led to the adoption 
of an “objective” test of mutual assent, whereby judges assume that all 
parties are reasonable actors.28  In so doing, judges test for mutual 
assent through words or actions taken by reasonable parties in similar 
situations.29  For instance, a reasonable contracting party reads and then 
signs a contract when he or she intends to be bound by a contract.30  If a 
party later argues that she did not in fact read the contract terms, 
although she did sign the contract, a judge will have no sympathy.  The 
reason being that through an objective lens, the objecting party acted as 
if she manifested mutual assent to the contract through signing the 
contract.31  A judge would not require that contracting parties be their 
brother’s keeper by ensuring that the other side actually read and 
understood the terms to the contract.32  All parties have a “duty to read” 
before manifesting their assent to a contract.33 
This objective theory of contracting developed during a time when 
contracts were typically negotiated in person, between two parties.34  
However, this theory has been extended to apply to all modern-day 
 
27. Id. 
28. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 201 
(1977) (arguing that the objective theory aided business and economic development, as it was 
“another measure of the influence of commercial interests in the shaping of American law”).  But 
see Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and 
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000) (arguing that in fact the objective theory was 
used from the earliest times). 
29. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 9, at 14 (1952) (“It is by the conduct of 
two parties, by their bodily manifestations, that we must determine the existence of what is called 
agreement. . . . This is what is meant by mutual assent.”). 
30. Id. § 31, at 51 (“One who signs his name to a writing that purports to be a contract does an 
act that is strong evidence that he intends to make himself a party thereto, bound as a promisor 
and entitled as a promisee.”). 
31. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 287 (2004) (“A party that signs an 
agreement is regarded as manifesting assent to it and may not later complain about not having 
read or understood it, even if the agreement is on the other party’s standard form.”);  see Lucy v. 
Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 517 (Va. 1954) (holding that the defendant’s agreement to sell land was 
enforceable because he signed an agreement, even though the defendant claimed to have been 
joking). 
32. Cf. Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 275, 278 (Md. 1952) (holding 
that even though the plaintiffs allegedly read the contract with one of the defendants, the 
defendants had a duty to read the contract themselves). 
33. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31 (“And since the objective theory of contracts imposes no 
requirement that one intend or even understand the legal consequences of one’s actions, one is not 
entitled to relief merely because one neither read the standard form nor considered the legal 
consequence of adhering to it.”). 
34. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 29 (discussing mutual assent, particularly the utilization of 
the language of “two parties”). 
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contracting, even though most contracts are no longer negotiated 
instruments,35 and with the rise of technology, typically not executed in 
person.36  This Part will explore the extension of the objective theory of 
contracting to modern contracts, as well as explain how this contract 
theory and trademarks overlap. 
A.  Extending the Objective Theory to Online Agreements 
The objective theory of contracting developed at a time when 
contracts were negotiated instruments, and typically only between two 
parties, with the negotiation done in person.37  It made sense that if one 
party acted in such a way that caused the other party to reasonably 
believe that a contract had been entered into, a court should so find.  
After all, in this traditional contracting model, if one party had questions 
or doubts about specific terms in the contract, they should raise those 
concerns at the time of negotiation, not afterwards.  A popularly cited 
treatise recaps the law as follows: 
But if a man acts negligently, and in such a way as to justify others in 
supposing that the terms of the writing are assented to by him and the 
writing is accepted on that supposition, he will be bound both at law 
and in equity.  Accordingly, even if an illiterate executes a deed under 
a mistake as to its contents, he is bound if he did not require it to be 
read to him or its object explained.38 
However, everyday contracting no longer takes the form as it once 
did.  Legal historians trace the ubiquitous “contract of adhesion” to the 
rise of mass production of consumer goods.39  In the 1920s, expensive 
consumer goods, like the Singer sewing machine, became available to 
middle-class consumers who could purchase these goods on installment 
 
35. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) (“The contracting still imagined by courts and law 
teachers as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire 
agreement, is no longer of much more than historical importance.”). 
36. See, e.g., How it Works, DOCUSIGN, https://www.docusign.com/how-it-works/electronic-
signature (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
37. See supra note 35; see also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts 
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943) (“Since a contract is the result 
of the free bargaining of parties who are brought together by the play of the market and who meet 
each other on a footing of social and approximate economic equality, there is no danger that 
freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole.”); Juliet M. Moringiello & 
William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the 
Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 452 (2013). 
38. Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 278 (Md. 1952) (citing to SAMUEL 
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1577 (rev. ed. 1937)). 
39. See Slawson, supra note 35, at 530 (“The predominance of standard forms is the best 
evidence of their necessity.  They are characteristic of a mass production society and an integral 
part of it.”). 
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plans.40  With the installment plan came a standard-form contract, 
drafted by the manufacturer, and offered to the consumer without any 
chance of negotiation (often dubbed “take-it-or-leave-it” terms).41  
Notwithstanding that these contracts no longer had the same indicia as 
traditional contracts, these agreements were held enforceable under the 
same objective theory of contracting.42  The reasoning for the extension 
of the objective theory into newer forms of contracts has been one of 
efficiency and business efficacy: the ability by one party to utilize the 
same contract terms without variation has arguably spurred on whole 
swathes of business industries.43 
One of the newest forms of contracts has been the online agreement.  
Often containing the suffix “-wrap,” these online contracts, such as 
“clickwraps” or “browsewraps,” are presented to a party in an electronic 
format, either on a computer, smartphone, or tablet.44  Not only are 
these online agreements adhesive, but the agreeing party does not 
always need to manifest assent before she is bound to the agreement.  
For clickwrap agreements, courts have held that the action of clicking 
the “I agree” button in order to continue with the website service or with 
an online purchase is sufficient to manifest assent.45  This is the case 
even where the terms are made available only through a link (as 
opposed to a scrollable window) or where the user never reads the 
terms.46  Additionally, these clickwraps may continue to be enforceable 
 
40. See LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
CONSUMER CREDIT 162 (1999). 
41. Kessler, supra note 37, at 632 (“[S]tandardized contracts are frequently contracts of 
adhesion; they are à prendre ou à laisser.”).  Professor Kessler traces the term “contract of 
adhesion” to Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 
198, 222 (1919) (“Life insurance contracts are contracts of ‘adhesion.’  The contract is drawn up 
by the insurer and the insured, who merely ‘adheres’ to it, has little choice as to its terms.”). 
42. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1185 (1983). 
43. KIM, supra note 8, at 27 (noting that the enforcement of contracts of adhesion “reflects 
another of contract law’s goals, which is to encourage and facilitate economic transactions. . . . 
[C]ontracts play an essential role in facilitating transactions because they increase trust, enhance 
reliability, and facilitate planning.”); Slawson, supra note 35, at 530 (“The predominance of 
standard forms is the best evidence of their necessity.  They are characteristic of a mass 
production society and an integral part of it.”). 
44. KIM, supra note 8, at 2–3 (explaining “wrap contracts”). 
45. Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237–39 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that 
plaintiff attorney had consented to the pricing terms of Google’s Adwords service even though 
the pricing model was not explicitly laid out in the clickwrap, but incorporated another Google 
document); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) 
(holding a forum selection clause enforceable because each of the plaintiffs had clicked their 
consent to the Microsoft member agreement containing the forum clause). 
46. Kim, supra note 8, at 275 (“But in this judicially constructed alternative universe—where 
a reasonable person is presumed to notice terms that are buried in hyperlinks—the courts apply 
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even where the drafter makes unilateral changes and does not receive a 
renewed consent, as the prior clickwrap typically contains a term that 
allows for these unilateral changes, no matter what they may be.47 
For browsewraps, which are often called “terms of use” or “policies” 
and are displayed via a hyperlink found all the way at the bottom of the 
webpage, courts similarly enforce these agreements.48  Courts have 
consistently held that these terms of use can be enforceable contracts if 
the users had adequate notice of them, even if the user never had to 
manifest assent or even read the terms.49 
Although courts may differentiate between the two types of 
agreements when testing for mutual assent, courts equally equate these 
online agreements to offline agreements.50  Therefore, the only inquiry 
that a court typically undertakes in an online agreement dispute is 
whether sufficient notice of the terms was given.51  For example, in 
Specht v. Netscape, the court held that where the consumers did not 
have sufficient notice of the terms of the online agreement, it was 
unenforceable.52  However, where websites provide sufficient notice of 
terms (even where the agreement is entered into after a purchase or 
browsing session), these contracts will be held enforceable under the 
objective theory of contracting.53  Instead of manifesting assent through 
some reasonable person’s actions, such as signing a paper document, 
courts have held that retaining a purchased product or one’s continued 
use of a website suffices as assent.54  The same reasoning of efficiency 
and business efficacy is used by many courts to justify the extension of 
the objective theory to online agreements. 
The enforceability of these online agreements allows website owners 
to insert terms that are unilaterally beneficial for the owners.55  A 
 
the duty to read.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1307, 1320 (2005). 
47. Knapp, supra note 8, at 329. 
48. KIM, supra note 8, at 41; Christina L. Kunz, et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of 
Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreement, 59 BUS. L. 279, 290 (2003). 
49. See Moringiello, supra note 46, at 1320 (“Because the courts tend to see no factual 
difference between paper and electronic contracts, they tend to hold that whenever a paper form 
reasonably communicates its terms, the analogous electronic form communicates its terms.”). 
50. Id. 
51. KIM, supra note 8, at 43. 
52. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29–30 (2d Cir. 2002). 
53. KIM, supra note 8, at 43. 
54. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004); supra note 
15; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use 
of the software was sufficient to consent to the agreement and that the consumer could have 
simply returned the computer). 
55. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the World Wide Web: Reforming 
Social Networks’ Contracting Parties, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1431, 1450 (2014) (undertaking 
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number of scholars and commentators have differentiated online 
agreements from offline agreements by calling out the types of harmful 
terms that online agreements include.56  Many of these agreements 
include a waiver of one’s right to litigate any dispute with the website 
owner, as well as an agreement to submit to binding arbitration.57  Other 
agreements include forum selection clauses, which require website users 
to submit to exclusive jurisdiction in areas far from their homes, 
disincentivizing users to bring lawsuits.58  In addition, many online 
agreements now contain clauses related to intellectual property, such as 
trademarks, which will be explored next. 
B.  How Do Trademarks Enter into the Mix? 
More and more, websites are including intellectual property-related 
terms in online agreements with their site users.  For example, a brief 
survey of the top fifty websites in the United States (as determined by 
Alexa) shows that all but four sites have some form of intellectual 
property-related term included in their online agreements.59  This is 
understandable with respect to copyright, as many online websites are 
subject to the “notice and take down” provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which requires that Internet 
intermediaries respond to copyright violation notifications.60  Due to 
this, many websites include clauses similar to eBay’s regarding the 
requirement that users not infringe on others’ copyrights, as well as how 
the website will respond to notifications of infringement: “We respond 
to notices of alleged copyright infringement under the United States 
 
an empirical study of social media sites and finding in part that social networks’ online 
agreements are excessively one-sided). 
56. See Preston & McCann, supra note 4, at 19–20 (finding onerous provisions in a survey of 
eight online service providers); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 55, at 1502 (finding that social 
media sites include provisions that violate EU regulations on fair contract provisions). 
57. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 55, at 1467–68. 
58. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
the Texas-based defendant agreed to forum in Ohio, the plaintiff’s place of business and 
acknowledging that “[i]t may be burdensome for Patterson to defend a suit in Ohio, but he knew 
when he entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement with CompuServe that he was 
making a connection with Ohio, and presumably he hoped that connection would work to his 
benefit”). 
59. See Top Sites in United States, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/US (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2016) (survey results on file with author). 
60. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(2012) (“The limitations on liability established by this section shall 
apply to a service provider only if the service provider—(A) has adopted and reasonably 
implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or 
network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers 
and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and 
(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.”). 
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  eBay’s Verified Rights Owner 
(VeRO) program works to ensure that listed items do not infringe upon 
the copyright, trademark or other intellectual property rights of third 
parties.”61 
With respect to other types of intellectual property, such as trademark 
rights, the inclusion is less understandable from a statutory perspective, 
as the DMCA does not apply to trademark law.62  In addition, there is 
currently no counterpart to the “notice and take down” requirement of 
the DMCA in any other federal trademark statute.  Notwithstanding 
this, forty-four out of the top fifty websites include some type of 
trademark-related provision.63  Similar to the copyright-related 
provisions, the trademark-related provisions are concerned with 
infringements of others’ trademark rights, as well as the website’s 
rights.  For example, Amazon’s online agreement states: “Amazon’s 
trademarks and trade dress may not be used in connection with any 
product or service that is not Amazon’s, in any manner that is likely to 
cause confusion among customers, or in any manner that disparages or 
discredits Amazon.”64 
These clauses are more understandable, however, in a world where 
online agreements are generally held to be enforceable.65  After all, 
trademarks are typically among the most valuable type of asset for 
online companies.66  For example, the trademark “Google” has been 
valued at $113 billion and is the company’s most valuable asset.67  
Therefore, it is prudent for companies to take steps to protect their 
valuable assets, including by contract.  Nonetheless, the problem with 
these clauses and their enforceability is that they may have an 
unintentional impact on other areas of the law, such as trademark law 
 
61. eBay User Agreement, EBAY (June 15, 2015), http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html. 
62. H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 63 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that the DMCA was enacted 
in order to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty). 
63. Supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
64. Amazon TOS, supra note 2. 
65. Unconscionability, the one doctrine that could have an impact on the enforcement of 
online agreements has been rarely used to do so.  Scholars have argued for the need to adjust the 
doctrine to better apply to the world of online contracting.  See KIM, supra note 8, at 207–10 
(arguing for a holistic view of unconscionability); Gibson, supra note 9, at 218–24 (arguing for a 
change in the doctrine). 
66. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary 
Research, 2 IP L. BOOK REV. 23, 23 (2011) (book review) (citing to half of Apple, Inc.’s 
valuation based on its trademark portfolio). 
67. Eric Goldman, Google Successfully Defends Its Most Valuable Asset in Court, FORBES 
(Sept. 15, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/09/15/google-success 
fully-defends-its-most-valuable-asset-in-court/. 
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and the doctrine concerning fame of a trademark.  This is particularly 
the case where online companies attempt to obtain recognition of less 
well-known trademarks or non-dominant portions of their trademarks 
through online agreements. 
II.  FAME AND TRADEMARK LAW 
The rise in the importance of fame in trademark law began around the 
turn of the twentieth century, tracking the rise in the importance of 
trademarks more generally.68  Whereas in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, Americans mainly lived in rural areas, the mid to 
late nineteenth century witnessed an explosion in urban living, due in 
large part to the Industrial Revolution.69  Business models were also 
altered, to keep up with changed living patterns.  When Americans lived 
in rural areas, they shopped locally and relied on their local shopkeepers 
to provide quality and consistency guarantees of the wares they sold.70  
With Americans living in large, urban areas, the intimacy and trust in a 
local shopkeeper gave way to anonymous, large chain department 
stores.71  This necessitated the rise in the importance of a trademark to 
signify quality and consistency.72  Instead of a local shopkeeper to 
inform the consumer about the qualities of the product, the trademark 
and its related advertising did that in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.73 
By the early twentieth century, household brand names, like “Rolls 
Royce,” “Aunt Jemima,” and “Kodak,” had developed in the United 
 
68. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 825 (1927) (“The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the 
public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from 
the particular product in connection with which it has been used.”). 
69. JAMES D. NORRIS, ADVERTISING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY: 
1865–1920, at 4–10 (1990) (providing table showing the growth of urban populations from 1870 
to 1920); DANIEL POPE, THE MAKING OF MODERN ADVERTISING 34–35 (1983); PAMELA 
WALKER LAIRD, ADVERTISING PROGRESS: AMERICAN BUSINESS AND THE RISE OF CONSUMER 
MARKETING 31 (2001) (“The second stage of industrialization, approximately 1870–1900, with 
its surge of invention and increased productivity, coincided with a dramatic expansion of world 
trade and provided the context for new developments in the marketplace.”). 
70. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 575 (2006) (“In this world of local rural communities, 
goodwill tended to attach to individual persons or small shops.”). 
71. LAIRD, supra note 69, at 26–27. 
72. Bone, supra note 70, at 577–78. 
73. See STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL 
ROOTS OF THE CONSUMER CULTURE 46–48 (1976); ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM: MAKING WAY FOR MODERNITY, 1920–1940, at 10 (1983) (“To induce 
consumers to read advertising copy that was often long and argumentative, the advertiser-as-
salesman was encouraged to use imagination and a ‘human-interest’ approach to appeal to their 
emotions.”). 
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States, but trademark law doctrine had not kept pace.74  This meant that 
where “Borden’s” was used only for condensed milk, a competitor 
could use “Borden’s” for ice cream, as traditional doctrine limited 
trademark protection to identical product categories.75  Frank Schechter, 
writing in the 1920s, railed against this in his now-famous article, The 
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, which was a call to protect 
famous marks against unauthorized dilutive uses.76  Courts and 
legislatures paid attention, and the mid to late twentieth century saw a 
rise in the attention paid to the fame of a trademark, also referred to as 
“trademark strength” or “acquired distinctiveness.”77  The thinking 
developed that a strong or famous trademark deserved extra legal 
protection in either confusingly similar uses or in dilutive ones.78 
A.  On the Importance of Being Famous 
Fame is important in two areas of trademark law.  The first is in 
straightforward trademark infringement cases, where the plaintiff seeks 
to enforce its rights in a trademark against a defendant who has 
allegedly been using either the same or a confusingly similar 
trademark.79  In these types of cases, the infringement standard is the 
“likelihood of confusion,” and fame appears as one of the factors that 
judges need to consider in the multifactor analysis.80  The second is in 
 
74. Schechter, supra note 68, at 813 (“[F]orward strides in trademark protection are being 
attained by appeals to ‘good conscience’ and ‘judicial sensibilities’ rather than to strictly legal 
principles derived from a critical analysis of the real tort involved.”). 
75. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912) 
(“The secondary meaning of a name, however, has no legal significance, unless the two persons 
make or deal in the same kind of goods.  Clearly the appellants here could make gloves, or plows, 
or cutlery, under the name ‘Borden’ without infringing upon any property right of the old 
company.  If that is true, they can make anything under the name ‘Borden’ which the appellee has 
not already made and offered to the public.”). 
76. Schechter, supra note 68, at 825–33. 
77. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellete, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 
351, 359 (2014).  Trademark strength is also used to refer to “inherent distinctiveness,” which is 
how unique a mark is from its inception.  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 
774 (1992).  The spectrum of inherent distinctiveness ranges from generic, descriptive, 
suggestive, fanciful, to arbitrary.  Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 
(2d Cir. 1976).  A trademark that is strong because it is inherently distinctive is not automatically 
famous.  I focus solely on the acquisition of fame in this Article and as mentioned earlier, I use 
the terms “fame” and “strength” interchangeably and to refer to acquired distinctiveness. 
78. Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 627, 638. 
79. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1877) (“Where the similarity is sufficient to 
convey a false impression to the public mind, and is of a character to mislead and deceive the 
ordinary purchaser in the exercise of ordinary care and caution in such matters, it is sufficient to 
give the injured party a right to redress.”). 
80. Each of the thirteen federal circuits has its own multifactor test for likelihood of 
confusion; however, each test includes a factor that examines the strength of the trademark at 
issue.  See Beebe, supra note 16, at 1589 (“Common to all of the circuits’ tests are four factors: 
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dilution cases, where the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the use by the 
defendant of the plaintiff’s trademark (either an identical use or one that 
is similar enough to give rise to an association) on noncompeting 
products.81  Fame is the threshold element in dilution cases, as only 
famous trademarks are allowed to enjoy antidilution protection.82 
1.  Fame in Trademark Infringement Cases 
The standard for trademark infringement is whether the defendant’s 
use of the trademark at issue would likely be confused with the 
plaintiff’s trademark.83  In order to assess this “likelihood of 
confusion,” judges utilize a multifactor test that varies among the 
federal circuits and can range from as little as six factors to as many as 
thirteen.84  Although the tests differ from circuit to circuit, one of the 
factors that is consistently analyzed is the “strength” factor.85  
“Strength” is used to refer to both inherent distinctiveness and acquired 
distinctiveness.86  Inherent distinctiveness is the type of trademark at 
hand, often placed on a spectrum of protectability, from generic and 
descriptive (obtaining no protection unless it has gained secondary 
meaning), to suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.87  This type of strength is 
not the same as fame, as fame in trademark infringement cases is 
correlated to market strength.88  Although courts are typically required 
 
the similarity of the marks, the proximity of the goods, evidence of actual confusion, and the 
strength of the plaintiff’s mark.”). 
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C) (2012). 
82. Id. § 1125(c)(1) (“Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction 
against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences 
use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely 
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”). 
83. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:12 (“The test of infringement is the likelihood of 
confusion, not the proof of actual confusion.”). 
84. See GRAEME DINWOODIE & MARK JANIS, TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 
521–23 (4th ed. 2014) (providing chart of all thirteen circuits’ likelihood of confusion multifactor 
tests). 
85. Beebe, supra note 16, at 1589. 
86. See supra note 77 (describing the concept of trademark strength). 
87. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The 
cases, and in some instances the Lanham Act, identify four different categories of terms with 
respect to trademark protection.  Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly reflects their 
eligibility to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, 
(2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.”); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros. 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) (“[A] mark is inherently distinctive if ‘[its] intrinsic 
nature serves to identify a particular source.’” (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana Inc., 505 
U.S. 763, 768 (1992))). 
88. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:83 (“Many arbitrary and suggestive terms may be 
conceptually and inherently strong, but if they receive little publicity through only meager 
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to assess both forms of distinctiveness for the strength factor,89 there is 
evidence to suggest that acquired distinctiveness, or fame, is more 
heavily weighted.90 
In fact, Professor Barton Beebe’s groundbreaking empirical analysis 
of the multifactor likelihood of confusion test shows that having a court 
determine that a trademark is strong in the marketplace can heavily 
influence the results of a case.  Out of the 192 preliminary injunction 
and bench trials sampled for his study, Professor Beebe found that 
where the plaintiff lost the strength factor, the plaintiff would also lose 
the case, with the court finding no likelihood of confusion.91  In 
addition, Professor Beebe found that in some cases, a finding of 
acquired strength could trump a finding of inherent weakness.92  From 
these results, Professor Beebe concluded that federal district courts (at 
least in practice) have acknowledged that a mark’s inherent strength is 
an element of that mark’s marketplace strength.93  Based on this, 
Professor Beebe advocates that courts should simply analyze the 
marketplace strength, or level of fame, when assessing the strength 
factor.94 
Given the importance of the level of fame of a trademark in the 
likelihood of confusion multifactor test analysis, what does a famous 
mark give you?  In a nutshell: strong trademark protection, which 
comes in two forms.  The first is in the lowered burden on the part of 
the strong trademark holder to prove a likelihood of confusion.  Where a 
plaintiff’s trademark has acquired a good level of market strength, 
courts are more likely to presume a likelihood of confusion.95  For 
example, in Virgin Enterprises, Inc. v. Nawab, although the Second 
Circuit went through all six of its likelihood of confusion factors, it gave 
 
advertising and feeble sales, they are relatively weak marks in the place where it counts: the 
marketplace.”). 
89. Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2004). 
90. Beebe, supra note 16, at 1636 (“Though most appellate courts have not yet come around 
to acknowledging it, district courts appear in practice to have recognized that the mark’s acquired 
or ‘actual strength’ in the marketplace logically incorporates the effects of the mark’s inherent 
strength.”). 
91. Id. at 1608 (explaining that out of the fifty-three cases where plaintiff lost the strength 
factor, plaintiff also lost the case in fifty of the cases). 
92. Id. at 1636 (“[C]ourts found marks to be inherently weak but commercially strong in 
twenty-three of the opinions sampled.  In twenty-two of these opinions, the court found that the 
strength factor favored confusion.”). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. (“Indeed, the results suggest that courts need not even consider inherent strength in 
their assessment of the strength factor, or that if they do, inherent strength should properly be 
understood as merely one factor . . . .”). 
95. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:73. 
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great weight to the fact that the plaintiff’s “Virgin” trademark was well 
known among consumers.96  As such, the court found a likelihood of 
confusion, even with evidence of which other courts are more skeptical 
(such as affidavits from former employees of defendants to prove actual 
confusion).97 
The second boon a strong trademark obtains is the “larger cloak of 
protection.”98  This means that based on the level of marketplace 
strength, courts will allow a strong trademark to enjoin third-party uses 
in not only competing goods, but in other related and even unrelated 
markets, as well.99  This is the case even where the plaintiff has not 
entered the related or unrelated market.  For example, in Elvis Presley 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, the Fifth Circuit found that the defendant’s 
use of the mark “Velvet Elvis” as a restaurant and bar name was likely 
to be confused with “Elvis” for entertainment services.100  The court 
concluded that due to the fame of the mark, “Elvis,” consumers would 
likely confuse the two, even though the plaintiff did not operate a 
restaurant (it only offered food at the Elvis Presley museum).101 
These two forms of expanded protection provide a famous trademark 
with wide-ranging powers to exclude almost all uses of third-party 
marks that may be confusingly similar to it.  Perhaps due in part to this, 
the United States has witnessed an explosion of trademark litigation in 
the past few decades, as well as a rise in abusive threats of trademark 
litigation.  Trademark holders are under the misapprehension that every 
third-party use of a trademark must be stopped, or else their trademarks 
will not be considered strong.  Unfortunately, the courts have had a 
hand in this, as one of the factors in determining whether a mark is 
 
96. Virgin Enters., Inc. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 149 (2003) (“The mark had been employed 
with world-wide recognition as the mark of an airline and as the mark for megastores selling 
music recordings and consumer electronic equipment.  The fame of the mark increased the 
likelihood that consumers seeing defendants’ shops selling telephones under the mark VIRGIN 
would assume incorrectly that defendants’ shops were a part of plaintiff’s organization.”). 
97. “Plaintiff submitted to the district court an affidavit of a former employee of defendant 
Cel-Net, who worked at a mall kiosk branded as Virgin Wireless, which stated that individuals 
used to ask him if the kiosk was affiliated with plaintiff’s VIRGIN stores.”  Id. at 151. 
98. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. R. Seelig & Hille, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 856, 860 (T.T.A.B. 
1978) (“[T]he law today rewards a famous or well-known mark with a larger cloak of protection 
than in the case of a lesser known mark because of the tendency of the consuming public to 
associate a relatively unknown mark with one to which they have long been exposed if the mark 
bears any resemblance thereto.”). 
99. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:73; see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, 
Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 418–19 (2010) (discussing example cases). 
100. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 203 (5th Cir. 1998). 
101. Id. (“The pervasiveness of EPE’s marks across the spectrum of products and the success 
and proliferation of entertainment and music-themed restaurants like Planet Hollywood and Hard 
Rock Café—which Capece testified inspired their parody—support a likelihood of confusion.”). 
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strong in the marketplace is examining the number of other uses of the 
mark.  For example, where the mark “Domino” was used for a variety 
of different products, not just sugar, the trademark holder of “Domino” 
for sugar was unable to enjoin the defendant from using the same mark 
for pizza delivery services.102  In addition, there is difficulty in proving 
marketplace strength, as the factors that courts use to assess strength in 
the marketplace are wide-ranging and not given uniform weight, which 
will be discussed further in Section B, infra.  As I will argue in Part III, 
this can lead to a use of contracts in an attempt to bolster an argument of 
fame, particularly where an entity desires to obtain dilution protection, 
which will be discussed next. 
2.  Fame in Dilution Cases 
Unlike a case of trademark infringement, a case of dilution does not 
require a plaintiff to prove a likelihood of confusion.103  Rather, a 
plaintiff must prove a likelihood of dilution; but before a plaintiff can 
make its case of dilution, it must prove that its mark is famous.104  
“Fame” under dilution law is slightly different from fame, or trademark 
strength, in trademark infringement law.  Professor Thomas McCarthy 
has likened fame under dilution as an “on/off switch.”105  A trademark 
is either famous for purposes of dilution, or it is not.  Further, unlike 
fame in trademark infringement law, federal dilution law has a statutory 
definition of a famous trademark: “[A] mark is famous if it is widely 
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a 
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”106  
In addition, there are four statutory factors for a court to use in order to 
assess fame: (1) the length of time and breadth of advertising of the 
trademark (either by the trademark holder or others); (2) the sales of the 
trademarked product; (3) whether the mark has actual fame and to what 
extent; and (4) whether the mark is registered.107 
If a markholder can prove that its trademark is famous, the benefits of 
dilution are wide ranging.  Dilution provides the markholder with the 
ability to enjoin uses of other trademarks that may dilute the famous 
mark either through blurring or tarnishment.108  Many scholars have 
 
102. Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The third-
party uses and registrations discussed above merely limit the protection to be accorded plaintiff’s 
mark outside the uses to which plaintiff has already put its mark.”). 
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (providing for a “likely to cause dilution” standard). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. § 1125(c)(1). 
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bemoaned these benefits as over-expansive and have called these 
developments in trademark law the “propertization” of trademarks.109  
This means that trademarks have become a thing unto themselves to 
protect, rather than just the reputation of the trademark.  Perhaps due in 
part to this, fame for purposes of dilution is supposed to be an extremely 
hard thing to prove in court or in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
proceedings.110  This is particularly the case since Congress amended 
the federal dilution law in 2006, and statutorily mandated that fame was 
based on a nationwide standard, not simply based on regional or niche 
fame.111  As the Federal Circuit has opined, “[i]t is well-established that 
dilution fame is difficult to prove.”112 
B.  On the Difficulty of Proving Fame 
Fame is difficult to prove in two aspects.  The first aspect is that 
courts place fame at a premium, requiring compelling evidence to prove 
fame, as the Federal Circuit indicated in the quote above.  The second 
aspect is that good, direct evidence of fame is hard to come by.  The 
reason for this is that direct evidence would typically come in the form 
of consumer testimony—whether consumers themselves view the mark 
as one that is famous.113  Because a mark’s fame is based on the breadth 
and reach of the mark’s recognition, one can imagine that quite a 
number of consumers would have to testify in order to have such 
evidence be probative.  As it is highly unlikely that any trademark 
holder would be able to afford this type of testimony, a shortcut for this 
has been the consumer survey.114  With a consumer survey, consumer 
 
109. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1693–94 (1998–99).  See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 
48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999); Dev S. Gangjee, Property in Brands, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 29 (Helena Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., 2013) (discussing 
the propertization trend in Europe more broadly, not just with respect to dilution).  
110. Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1158 n.86 (2006) (“The [new federal trademark 
antidilution law] is simply not intended to protect trademarks whose fame is at all in doubt.”); see 
also MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:104. 
111. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:105 (“One of the purposes of the 2006 [Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act] statutory revisions was to prevent courts from labeling a mark as ‘famous’ 
because it was well-known only in a local geographical territory or in a local product or service 
line.”). 
112. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(holding that the mark “COACH” for luxury handbags was not famous for dilution purposes). 
113. Greene & Wilkerson, supra note 11, at 537 (“[W]hat matters most is how consumers in 
the marketplace react to the mark.”). 
114. Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies and Fair 
Use, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 169 (2008) (“Sometimes, courts do find out about the mental 
impressions of real people—through consumer surveys and the like.”); see also MCCARTHY, 
supra note 10, § 11:83 (“Determining the strength of any mark requires weighing either or both 
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psychologists devise questions and sampling methods in order to 
extrapolate the percentage of consumers that recognize the trademark 
(and perhaps to what extent).115  The problem with this method is that 
surveys are often flawed and judges (as well as opposing counsel) are 
able to find holes and problems with many surveys such that they are 
not always probative evidence.116 
With direct evidence of fame being so difficult to obtain, courts often 
rely on a variety of different factors and evidence in order to 
circumstantially assess the acquired strength or fame of a particular 
mark.117  Where a court is assessing the strength of a mark under a 
confusion analysis, the factors it uses are not mandated by statute.  
Rather, these factors are the same used to analyze whether a descriptive 
mark has acquired sufficient distinctiveness to be considered a 
trademark, or what is termed as “secondary meaning.”118  The idea 
behind secondary meaning is that consumers can come to recognize 
certain trademarks through activities undertaken by the trademark 
holder, including sales of products, advertising, and the extent and 
nature of the trademark use.119  Although the term secondary meaning 
was traditionally used to refer to the threshold of distinctiveness that a 
descriptive term needed to have in order to become a trademark, the 
term is often used interchangeably with “acquired distinctiveness.”  In 
turn, “acquired distinctiveness” is used interchangeably with the terms 
trademark strength or fame.   
In essence, the strength of a trademark for purposes of the likelihood 
of confusion analysis is on a spectrum from weak to very strong.120  As 
 
circumstantial evidence of advertising and promotion and direct evidence of consumer 
recognition, such as by a survey.”). 
115. See Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and Procedural 
Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1027, 1036–37 
(2007–08) (discussing surveys in the context of measuring likelihood of confusion). 
116. See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 797 (5th Cir. 
1983), abrogated by KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 
(2004) (“This survey provides us with nothing more than some data regarding fish friers’ 
perceptions about products used for frying chicken.  As such, it is entitled to little evidentiary 
weight.”). 
117. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:83. 
118. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2013), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Although secondary meaning and 
fame are different issues, here they rise and fall on largely the same evidence.”); see also Greene 
& Wilkerson, supra note 11, at 555 (“We argue that the evidence relevant to those two 
inquiries—acquired strength and secondary meaning—is not just similar but in fact identical.”). 
119. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 795 (“Factors such as amount and manner of advertising, volume 
of sales, and length and manner of use may serve as circumstantial evidence relevant to the issue 
of secondary meaning.”). 
120. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:75 (providing the “Strength Thermometer”). 
15_GRINVALD FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2016  1:32 PM 
2016] Contracting Trademark Fame? 1313 
mentioned above, however, where a court is assessing the fame of a 
mark under a dilution analysis, the factors are statutorily mandated, 
although some bear resemblance to those discussed under secondary 
meaning.121 
While these activities appear easy to document for trademark holders, 
some courts scrutinize evidence that is provided to prove acquired 
distinctiveness.  The courts parse through these factors in order to 
ascertain whether, and to what extent, consumers have “establish[ed] 
the necessary link in the minds of consumers between a product and its 
source.”122  Recent cases where trademarks were not found famous 
provide evidence that courts are strictly scrutinizing evidence brought 
by trademark holders.  For example, in the Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc. dispute over the term “App Store,” the court found that even though 
Apple had produced substantial amounts of evidence to attempt to prove 
its mark was famous, it was not enough.123  The court stated, “[t]he 
mark does appear to enjoy widespread recognition, but it is not clear 
from the evidence whether it is recognition as a trademark or 
recognition as a descriptive term.”124  Perhaps due in part to this, online 
companies are looking to new avenues, such as online agreements and 
consumer behavior, as a way to bolster evidence of strength or fame. 
III.  CONTRACTING TRADEMARK FAME? 
As discussed above, courts are typically required to use proxies in 
order to assess the real strength or fame of a trademark in consumers’ 
eyes.  These proxies include a number of different factors, such as sales, 
advertising dollars spent, and the length and breadth of trademark 
use.125  The problem with these factors (particularly if the trademark use 
is more recent) is that they do not always shed light on the connection 
between the consumer and the trademark.126  Combined with the fact 
that strength or fame is supposed to be a high hurdle to cross, it appears 
that more recently, courts have been amenable to utilizing other types of 
evidence, such as the number of website users or smartphone and tablet 
 
121. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012), with Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 795 (illustrating 
that while the statute allows for consideration of all relevant factors, case law makes clear that no 
one factor is determinative, and that other circumstantial evidence may be considered as well). 
122. Id.  
123. Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., No. C 11-1327 PJH, 2011 WL 2638191, at *11 (N.D. 
Cal. July 6, 2011). 
124. Id. 
125. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 795. 
126. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a 
More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1343 (2012) 
(“The problem is that mark strength has no obvious relationship to likely confusion.”). 
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application downloads, as ways to prove strength or fame through 
commercial success.127 
This is generally a positive development as it fits in with my 
suggestion to adopt an interactive theory of consumer recognition, 
which will be discussed further in Part IV.  Nonetheless, this 
development can be problematic where a plaintiff argues that non-
dominant trademarks or portions of their trademarks are separately 
famous, simply based on the number of users they have or downloads 
they receive.128  Part of the premise on which this argument may 
implicitly rely is that these users have agreed to acknowledge the 
plaintiff’s trademarks through the online agreement they entered into 
when they first signed up.129  For example, in Facebook’s enforcement 
efforts at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the company has 
argued that “FBook” and “Book” are separately famous trademarks 
based in part on having over one billion users.130  While this argument 
has traction with respect to the dominant trademark “Facebook,” it has 
much less traction with respect to the individual portions of the 
dominant mark, or even abbreviations that are not used on the website.  
In this Part, I will explore further these recent developments, and then 
turn to my arguments against the potential extension of the objective 
theory of contract law to trademark law. 
A.  Recent Developments 
The use of contracts to restrict third-party uses of one’s trademarks, 
or even to acquire recognition of one’s marks, is not a new 
development.  Traditionally, these types of clauses are included in 
licensing situations, such as where a franchisor has licensed its 
trademarks to a franchisee,131 or where a manufacturer contracts with 
 
127. See, e.g., Treemo, Inc. v. Flipboard, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1355 (W.D. Wash. 2014) 
(using Flipboard’s app downloads as evidence of trademark strength).  In addition, some scholars 
have argued for more technologically savvy ways to test for consumer recognition of trademarks, 
such as the search hierarchy on Google; see also Ouellete, supra note 77, at 357. 
128. See supra note 13 (discussing Facebook’s arguments in U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office oppositions). 
129. In addition, it appears to be the basis for which some companies discontinue the alleged 
infringer’s account, such as when Facebook threatened to discontinue Lamebook’s account on 
Facebook.  See Mandour & Associates, Lamebook to Keep Name After Trademark Dispute with 
Facebook, INTELL. PROP. NEWS.COM (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.intellectualpropertynews.com/ 
trademark-news/lamebook-to-keep-name-in-trademark-dispute-with-facebook/. 
130. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
131. See, e.g., Dunkin Donuts Franchising LLC v. Claudia III, LLC, No. 14-2293, 2015 WL 
4243534, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2015) (“Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a Franchise 
Agreement in 2009.  Pursuant to this contract, Plaintiffs granted Defendants a license to use 
Plaintiffs’ trademarks and trade dress and permitted Defendants to receive other forms of 
logistical and marketing support from Plaintiffs.”). 
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distribution partners.  These agreements typically include trademark 
licensing provisions (or incorporate separate license agreements) and 
disputes may arise as to the scope of the use of the licensed marks, 
particularly after termination of the agreement.132 
With the proliferation of online agreements, it is not surprising that 
these types of provisions or possible uses of contractual provisions in 
offline agreements are making their way into online ones.133  As I 
mentioned briefly above in Part I.B, forty-four out of fifty of the top 
U.S. websites I surveyed have some sort of trademark-related provision 
in their online agreements.134  These can be broken down into three 
different categories: (1) the specific listing of marks; (2) the “catch all” 
provision; and (3) the catch all with branding guidelines.  Although I 
break these clauses into three different categories, a number of the 
online agreements combine one or more of these categories.135 
Here are some examples of these provisions in order to ground the 
discussion.  First, the specific listing of marks can be found in the 
Amazon online agreement (called “Conditions of Use”) where the 
trademark-related provision states: “Click here to see a non-exhaustive 
list of Amazon trademarks.  In addition, graphics, logos, page headers, 
button icons, scripts, and service names included in or made available 
through any Amazon Service are trademarks or trade dress of Amazon 
in the U.S. and other countries.”136  Clicking on the link brings you to 
 
132. See, e.g., id. (“Shortly after terminating the Franchise Agreement, Plaintiffs filed this 
lawsuit.  The lawsuit alleges Defendants breached the Franchise Agreement and continued to 
operate their store and use Plaintiff’s intellectual property without a license to do so, in violation 
of federal trademark and unfair competition law.”); Coldwell Banker Real Estate, LLC v. DC 
Prop. & Loans, Inc., No. C 13-4732 SBA, 2014 WL 5474584, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014).  In 
Coldwell Banker the franchise agreement between plaintiff and defendant stated: 
Paragraph 14.3 of the Franchise Agreement, entitled “Discontinuance of the Franchised 
Business’ sets forth Defendants” obligations in the event of termination of the 
Franchise Agreement, including: (1) not directly or indirectly at any time or in any 
manner identifying themselves or their business as a current or former franchise of 
Coldwell Banker; (2) not using any of the Coldwell Banker® Marks or any imitation 
thereof; (3) canceling fictitious name registrations related to Defendants’ use of the 
COLDWELL BANKER® Marks; (4) giving written notice to the telephone company 
and all telephone directory publishers of the termination of Defendants’ right to use the 
COLDWELL BANKER® Marks in connection with any telephone number or listing; 
and (5) immediately discontinuing use, for any purpose, of all signs, advertising 
materials, and other materials or supplies which display or include the COLDWELL 
BANKER® Marks. 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate, LLC, 2014 WL 5474584, at *3. 
133. Kim, supra note 9, at 275 (discussing the cyclical nature of online-offline agreements). 
134. See Top Sites in United States, supra note 59. 
135. See, e.g., Apple Website Terms of Use, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ 
legal/internet-services/terms/site.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2009). 
136. Amazon TOS, supra note 2. 
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another webpage where Amazon lists approximately 462 trademarks 
that it claims ownership over.137  Second, the “catch all” provision 
refers to the use of the online company to claim everything and 
anything on their website as a trademark (or trade dress), such as 
Twitter’s “Terms of Service” clause: “Nothing in the Terms gives you a 
right to use the Twitter name or any of the Twitter trademarks, logos, 
domain names, and other distinctive brand features.”138  And finally, the 
catch all provision plus brand guidelines includes a broad statement of 
trademark rights, as well as provides a link to do’s and don’ts of the 
company’s trademarks.  An example of this third category of trademark 
provisions can be found in Tumblr’s “Terms of Service,” which state: 
“Any use of Tumblr’s trademarks, branding, logos, and other such 
assets in connection with the Services shall use Tumblr’s approved 
branding and shall be in accordance with the Tumblr Trademark 
Guidelines.”139  Clicking on the Tumblr “Trademark Guidelines” takes 
you to another webpage that provides the ability to download specific 
marks, such as the “t” icon, as well as rules for the downloader to abide 
by.140 
It is unclear what is primarily motivating the inclusion of these 
provisions into online agreements.  One possible reason could be that it 
is simply rational for a company’s lawyer to include these provisions 
into the online agreement because there are no negative legal 
consequences for doing so, or that they are similar to clauses that appear 
in offline agreements.141  In fact, because trademarks are such valuable 
intellectual property rights, it could be that not including these 
trademark-related provisions would be considered negligent.  With 
respect to category one, the specific listing of trademarks, as well as 
category three, the catch all plus brand guidelines, it could also be that 
companies are attempting to put the world on notice that they are 
claiming rights to certain marks, similar to the way a trademark marking 
(“TM” or “®”) puts the world on notice of rights.142 
If these were the only possible reasons behind the inclusion of these 
provisions, they would not necessarily be problematic.  Yet, based on 
 
137. Id. 
138. Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en (last updated Jan. 27, 
2016). 
139. Terms of Service, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/terms-of-service (last 
updated Jan. 27, 2014). 
140. Using the Logo, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/logo (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
141. See supra notes 131 & 132. 
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL 
OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 906 (2015), https://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current#/current/ 
TMEP-900d1e1285.html (“Federal Registration Notice”). 
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the types of trademarks included in the category one provisions and the 
legal arguments that some trademark holders are making in trademark 
opposition proceedings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, there 
seems to be a problematic reason for including these provisions into 
online agreements.  First, some mark holders are claiming not only 
dominant marks, but also non-dominant marks that appear on the 
holders’ websites.  An example of this is Amazon’s claimed mark for 
“A to Z.”143  Second, some trademark holders are arguing that portions 
of their dominant marks are famous based on the number of website 
users they have.  As mentioned above, an example of this is Facebook’s 
argument that “Fbook” and “Book” are separately famous marks based 
in part on their number of users.144  Therefore, it would appear that 
some trademark holders are including these provisions in order to 
implicitly underscore their arguments of trademark fame for non-
dominant trademarks or separate portions of their dominant marks. 
Perhaps more problematic is that there are hints that courts (including 
the Trademark Trial and Appellate Board) are accepting these 
arguments and perhaps are even finding them persuasive.  In the past 
year or so, there have been cases that provide support for this trend.  
One recent case utilized a license agreement with a well-known entity to 
prove the validity and strength of its trademark.  In the House of Bryant 
Publications, LLC v. City of Lake City, Tennessee, the plaintiff was able 
to convince the court (at a preliminary injunction stage) that its 
trademark (“ROCKY TOP”) was valid, as well as strong or famous for 
purposes of a likelihood of confusion analysis due to its license 
agreement with the University of Tennessee.145  The court accepted the 
plaintiff’s arguments that the University of Tennessee was a well-
known entity, such that the House of Bryant trademarks would be as 
well.146  A second recent case from the Middle District of Florida, Meth 
Lab Cleanup, LLC v. Spaulding Decon, utilized a settlement agreement 
that had been previously entered into between the parties whereby the 
defendant had agreed to acknowledge the validity of the plaintiff’s 
arguably generic trademark.147  Although the court did not explicitly 
 
143. Amazon TOS, supra note 2. 
144. See supra note 13. 
145. House of Bryant Publ’ns, LLC v. Lake City, Tenn., No. 3:14-CV-93-TAV-HBG, 2014 
WL 5449672, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 2014) (“Plaintiff argues that its ‘ROCKY TOP’ marks 
are famous, as the phrase is ‘an immediately recognizable and highly distinctive trademark most 
strongly associated with Plaintiff’s primary licensee, the University of Tennessee’ . . . .  The 
Court finds these points persuasive at this juncture to suggest that [P]laintiff’s marks are strong.” 
(citation omitted)). 
146. Id. 
147. Meth Lab Cleanup, LLC v. Spaulding Decon, No. 8:14-cv-3129-T-30TBM, 2015 WL 
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state this, implicit in the court’s finding that the defendant could not 
challenge the validity of the plaintiff’s mark was an adoption of the 
objective theory of contracting: even if the defendant never read the 
agreement, he did manifest an objective intention to enter into it, and 
therefore should be bound by it.148 
There is some evidence that courts may be delineating between 
contracts as evidence (like the House of Bryant and Meth Clean Up 
Labs cases were doing) and user numbers.  For example, in a recent 
case from the Western District of Washington, Treemo, Inc. v. 
Flipboard, Inc., the court found probative the evidence submitted by 
Flipboard that its marks, “F” and “Flipboard,” were strong due in part to 
its user numbers and monthly downloads.149  The court stated that: 
“Evidence adduced at trial overwhelmingly establishes that the 
FLIPBOARD marks are commercially strong.  Over 130 million people 
have used the Flipboard app, and 200,000 to 300,000 new users are 
added every day.”150  In addition, this case does provide evidence that 
courts are more amenable to accepting newer forms of technological 
evidence to provide support for strength or fame.  This is also mirrored 
in decisions from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.151 
Notwithstanding the Flipboard case, the cases involving offline 
agreements and the arguments being made in trademark opposition 
proceedings do provide cause for concern.  Particularly with respect to 
federal district court cases, where judges are fond of using contracts as 
evidence, perhaps due in part to their seeming objectivity and the strong 
trend toward upholding the freedom to contract in the United States.152  
In addition, courts have very infrequently distinguished between offline 
and online agreements.153  In fact, since the earliest cases, courts have 
analogized between offline and online agreements and have upheld the 
enforceability of online agreements based on the similar requirements of 
offline agreements.154  For example, in the earliest case of 
 
4496193, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2015). 
148. Id. at *8. 
149. Treemo, Inc. v. Flipboard, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1355 (W.D. Wash. 2014). 
150. Id. 
151. See Ouellete, supra note 77, at 399 (“[A]lthough courts have been reluctant to rely on 
search results, the TTAB is considering such evidence more frequently, although this acceptance 
is not uniform.”). 
152. Jones v. U-Haul Co. of Mass. & Ohio Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 922, 942 (S.D. Ohio 2014) 
(“Ohio courts hold the ‘concept of freedom of contract to be fundamental to our society.’” 
(quoting Royal Indem. Co. v. Baker Protective Serv., Inc., 515 N.E.2d 5, 7 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1986))). 
153. Moringiello, supra note 46, at 1320. 
154. Id. 
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browsewraps, the Second Circuit in Specht v. Netscape found that the 
online agreement was invalid due to a lack of notice of the contract 
terms.155  However, where all the requirements of offline agreements 
are met, courts routinely uphold all types of online agreements.156  All 
of this leads to the very real possibility that when confronted with 
online agreements to bolster proof of trademark strength or fame, courts 
will be amenable to accepting such evidence.  In so doing, courts will be 
implicitly importing the objective theory of contracting into trademark 
law.  As I will argue in the next Section, this would be extremely 
problematic for at least two reasons. 
B.  Normative Arguments Against Importing the Objective Theory of 
Contracting into Trademark Law 
There are at least two normative arguments to be made against 
importing the objective theory of contracting into trademark law.  The 
first is a theoretical disconnect between the two disciplines, and the 
second is that such an adoption would lower the burden of proof for 
trademark fame.  Lowering the burden of proof comes with 
consequences, such as fostering an anticompetitive business 
environment.  I will discuss these two arguments in turn. 
1.  Theoretical Disconnect 
Contract law and trademark law are connected areas of the law.  
After all, trademarks are vehicles through which products are sold and 
contracts are the mode of transportation.  Without contract law, 
trademarks would not be as valuable as they are today because many 
businesses may not have flourished without the certainty of 
contracting.157  Therefore, it may seem natural that contact theory may 
be equally applicable to trademark law.  While this may be true with 
respect to other contract theories, with respect to the objective theory of 
contracting and trademark law’s fame doctrine, this is not the case.  In 
fact, there is a serious theoretical disconnect between the objective 
theory and the realist theory that underlies the fame doctrine. 
The theoretical premises upon which the objective theory of 
contracting is based are efficiency and business efficacy.  As I discussed 
 
155. Specht, et al. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29–30 (2d Cir. 2002). 
156. KIM, supra note 8, at 43. 
157. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  An example of this is the Singer sewing 
machine, which was one of the success stories of the standard-form contract.  The Singer sewing 
machine and its trademark became so popular that in 1896, the trademark was declared generic by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 203 (1896) 
(“[T]he word ‘Singer,’ as we have seen, had become public property, and the defendant had a 
right to use it.”). 
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in Part I.A above, the objective theory of contracting was adopted to 
stabilize the certainty of contract enforcement.  Under the objective 
theory, outward manifestations of assent to an agreement (a handshake, 
signature, etc.) were sufficient to bind the parties to their contract, even 
if they subjectively had different meanings or expectations.  While 
courts developed interpretative doctrines and defenses to resolve 
disputes, the objective theory had the desired effect of fostering a stable 
contracting environment.  Instead of contract dissolution in the event of 
two different subjective meanings, courts would look at interpretative 
doctrines and maxims such as “contra proferentum” (construing a 
written document’s ambiguity against the drafter).158 
Although the objective theory of contracting is good for business, it is 
in essence a legal fiction.  One of the downsides to a purely objective 
approach is that parties may be deemed to be bound to a contract neither 
of the parties intended.159  With the objective theory of contracting, 
however, the burden is placed on the parties to ensure that they 
understand the terms of the contract (including the other party’s 
meaning of the terms) before manifesting an outward sign of assent.  
Aside from some limited exceptions, this burden is maintained in all 
contracting situations, even where assenting parties do not receive 
contractual terms until after they have accepted them, or when the terms 
are too complicated or long to be understood by an average reader.160 
By contrast, I argue that legal realism and subjectivity are the 
theoretical premises upon which trademark law’s doctrine of fame 
(ranging from the spectrum of secondary meaning, strong to famous) is 
based.  Rather than adopting legal fictions for the sake of efficiency, the 
search for a mark’s fame is grounded in factual context.  As I discussed 
in Part II, the analysis of a mark’s acquired distinctiveness is one 
grounded in the reality of consumer perception.161  The goal of an 
acquired distinctiveness analysis is to figure out how consumers really 
perceive the mark at issue.  This is an inherently subjective inquiry into 
the minds of the consumers and is reflected in how judges and courts 
approach the analysis.  Judges claim to put themselves in the shoes of 
the consumer, even where consumers are young children or women and 
 
158. See Miller v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 502 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Contra 
proferentem construes all ambiguities against the drafter.”). 
159. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 25, at 375 (“This objective approach, however, 
led to the striking conclusion that contractual language could be given a meaning that neither of 
the parties intended.”). 
160. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 55, at 1447. 
161. See supra note 113. 
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the judge is a male.162  Further, judges claim to speak for consumers in 
deciding what would be important to them or not.  For example, in 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Justice Scalia 
purported to speak for consumers: “The consumer who buys a branded 
product does not automatically assume that the brand-name company is 
the same entity that came up with the idea for the product, or designed 
the product—and typically does not care whether it is.”163 
Unfortunately, as explained above in Part II, obtaining direct 
evidence of consumers’ subjective perceptions of trademarks is 
difficult.  Due to this, courts have developed proxies for attempting to 
pierce the consumer mind—these proxies are all grounded in context, 
which is the hallmark of legal realism.164  Assumptions are made about 
these proxies and their impact on consumers; for example, where a 
trademark has been in use over a wide geographical territory, along with 
a progression in sales and money spent on advertising, the assumption is 
that consumers will have come to recognize the trademark (and perhaps 
even have a high recognition).165  These assumptions, however, are an 
attempt to ground the inquiry in reality. 
Therefore, courts are conducting an analysis under trademark law that 
is completely the opposite of contract law.  Yet, if the objective theory 
of contracting were imported into trademark law for the purposes of 
determining a mark’s acquired distinctiveness, we would be replacing 
the long-standing goal of legal reality for one steeped in fiction.  By 
presuming that consumers recognize trademarks that they have never 
encountered, but are listed on a click-through webpage from an online 
agreement, the resulting effect would be theoretical dissonance.  This 
would cause an inconsistency between the fame doctrine and other 
trademark doctrines, such as functionality or even confusion.  In 
addition, flowing from such an importation of the objective theory 
would be an undesired consequence of lowering the burden of proof of 
fame, which will be discussed next. 
2.  Lowering the Burden of Proof for Fame 
Currently, the burden of proof for fame is set at a high bar.166  The 
rationale behind this is fairly straightforward.  At each stage of the 
trademark fame spectrum, a trademark increasingly gains a larger scope 
 
162. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 779–88 (2004). 
163. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003). 
164. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 25, at 12–13. 
165. Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Centaur Commc’ns v. A/S/M Commc’ns, 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
166. See supra Part II.B. 
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of rights and a greater ability to exclude others from using such mark.  
Starting from the birth of a mark, anything under the sun, including 
common everyday words, can be considered a trademark if it is 
considered distinctive.167  Being granted a trademark for a common 
word or design means that the mark holder has the ability to exclude 
others from using such mark, depending on the level of fame.  Simply 
acquiring distinctiveness limits the scope of exclusivity to the same 
category of products as the mark—for example, a trademark used for a 
magazine could not enjoin the use of the same trademark for women’s 
clothing or food.168  However, the scope expands further in the life of 
the trademark.  If a mark is considered commercially strong, the 
trademark holder will be able to exclude others from using the same or 
similar marks on related products.  Thus, a trademark used for women’s 
clothing could enjoin uses in other product categories, such as personal 
care.169  Finally, at the end of the spectrum, a famous mark’s scope of 
exclusivity is almost limitless.  It makes sense, therefore, to set the 
burden of proof at a fairly high level, as a holder of a famous trademark 
is able to control almost all unauthorized uses of its mark.  For example, 
Louis Vuitton, with its famous “toile” monogram was able to enjoin 
Hyundai from using a one-second clip of a basketball with a similar 
design in one of its car commercials.170 
If the objective theory of contracting were imported into trademark 
law, the current high bar for proof of fame would be lowered for some 
large entities.  The ability to prove fame through the use of online 
agreements would mean that those large entities with popular websites 
would easily be able to prove fame for all of their trademarks simply 
through the number of users.  For instance, Twitter has approximately 
304 million monthly active users, while Facebook has approximately 
1.49 billion.171  While these large entities’ dominant marks are likely 
 
167. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (“Since human beings 
might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, 
this language, read literally, is not restrictive.”). 
168. See Wish Atlanta, LLC v. Contextlogic, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-51, 2015 WL 7761265, at *8 
(M.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2015) (holding that the plaintiff’s “WISH” marks for clothing were weak and 
therefore the plaintiff could not enjoin the defendant from using the same mark in the technology 
field); see also Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle Assocs. Inc., 332 F.2d 534, 540 (3d Cir. 
1964). 
169. See Wet Seal Inc. v. FD Mgmt. Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1641–42 (T.T.A.B. 
2007). 
170. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611(PKC), 2012 WL 
1022247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). 
171. Facebook: Number of Monthly Active Users Worldwide 2008–2015, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/ 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2015); Twitter: The Number of Monthly Active Users 2010-2015, STATISTA, 
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strong or famous, their online agreements contain references to 
trademarks that are not dominant (or not even used on the main website) 
or are portions of the dominant mark.172  The objective theory would 
have courts accepting the legal fiction of consumer recognition, thereby 
providing these non-dominant or portions of dominant marks the status 
of strong or famous, with the resulting high levels of protection as 
described above. 
There are serious consequences from lowering the burden of proof 
for fame and providing such high levels of protection.  These include 
depletion of the English language, erosion of free speech, and business 
competition concerns.  With respect to the English language, new 
research is shedding light on the long-held assumption that the pool 
from which to pick new trademarks is very large.173  Professors Barton 
Beebe and Jeanne Fromer are analyzing the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office’s recently released Trademark Case Files Dataset, which consists 
of information relating to 7.4 million trademark applications filed with 
the Office between the years 1870 and 2014.174  What they are finding 
is empirical evidence that the size of the universe from which to pick 
trademarks is shrinking.  In fact, Professors Beebe and Fromer have 
found from this dataset that there is already a high proportion of English 
words registered in the United States and a “limited availability of 
possible coinages not already identical or similar to registered word 
marks.”175  Based on this, if a greater proportion of registered 
trademarks were considered strong or famous, whole swathes of the 
English language would be considered proprietary intellectual property 
of private entities. 
The privatization of the English language leads to the next problem 
with lowering the burden of proof for fame, which is a curtailment of 
free speech in the United States.  The rise of the Internet has not only 
seen a rise in the use of online agreements, but also in the ability by 
 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-monthly-active-twitter-users/ (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2016). 
172. See, e.g., Amazon TOS, supra note 2; Facebook 2013 TOS, supra note 10. 
173. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 172 (2003) (“[T]he universe from which trademarks are picked 
is very large. . . . The number of distinctive yet pronounceable combinations of letters to form 
words that will serve as a suitable trademark is very large, implying a high degree of 
substitutability and hence only a slight value in exchange.” (footnote omitted)). 
174. Barton Beebe & Jeanne Fromer, Is the Frontier Closing?  Registration Rates of 
Frequently Used Words on the PTO’s Trademark Register, http://law.depaul.edu/about/centers-
and-institutes/center-for-intellectual-property-law-and-information-technology/programs/ip-
scholars-conference/Documents/ipsc_2015/abstracts-papers-presentation/BeebeB_abstract.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
175. Id. 
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trademark holders to detect any potential infringement of their claimed 
trademarks.176  For example, consumer reviews that were previously 
limited to word of mouth or in print (such as Consumer Reports) are all 
available online and now easily discovered by trademark holders.177  
Trademark holders are attempting to control all uses of their marks 
online, particularly in cases where third-party uses are not positive ones.  
This can result in trademark holders bringing infringement allegations 
and actions against reviewers, such as in the International Payment 
Services, LLC v. Cardpaymentoptions.com, Inc. case.178  The defendant 
in that case had reviewed the plaintiff’s credit services and the online 
reviews included the plaintiff’s trademark and logo.  The defendant’s 
review (as well as forty other reviews of the plaintiff’s services) was not 
very complimentary.179  The plaintiff alleged trademark infringement 
for the use of its mark on the site.  Luckily, the court (as have other 
courts) found in the defendant’s favor, holding that the defense of 
nominative fair use shielded the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
trademark in this manner.180  As Professor Eric Goldman has 
consistently noted, the fact that courts are routinely finding in favor of 
defendants in cases like these has not stopped trademark holders from 
bringing such lawsuits.181 
Unfortunately, what these types of trademark holders are attempting 
to accomplish is to stifle speech.  As Professor Goldman has 
insightfully stated, “it’s ludicrous to hold a review website liable for 
trademark infringement for reviewing the trademark owner—especially 
when it’s a critical review, which increases our suspicion that the 
trademark owner is really seeking to suppress negative commentary, not 
redress a trademark injury.”182  In addition to attempting to stifle 
negative commentary, trademark holders may also attempt to stifle 
commercial speech by competitors or other businesses.  A particular 
instance when there may be an unconstitutional restriction of free 
 
176. Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing Cease-and-Desist Letters, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 418 
(2015) (“Potential violations of one’s rights are easily discoverable with specialized software or 
even by conducting a quick Google search.”). 
177. ERIC GOLDMAN, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 411–12 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008). 
178. Complaint, Int’l Payment Servs., LLC v. CardPaymentOptions.com, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-
02604-CBM-JC (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2015), 2014 WL 1418671. 
179. Id. at 2. 
180. Id. at 12. 
181. Eric Goldman, Competitive Keyword Advertising Permitted as Nominative Use—
ElitePay Global v. CardPaymentOptions, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (June 17, 2015), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/06/competitive-keyword-advertising-permitted-as-
nominative-use-elitepay-global-v-cardpaymentoptions.htm. 
182. Id. 
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speech is where the trademark in question is a descriptive mark,183 as 
advocated by Professor Lisa Ramsey.184  Professor Ramsey has 
eloquently argued that,  
[c]ommercial expression is suppressed more than necessary when our 
trademark laws allow one company to register the descriptive term 
“Park ‘N Fly” for airport parking lot services, and enjoin competitors, 
such as “Dollar Park and Fly,” from using “Park and Fly” as part of 
their brand name to inform customers that they can park and fly at this 
particular airport parking lot.185 
As can be seen, free speech concerns occur across the spectrum of 
potential speakers.  If the burden of proof for fame were lowered, it is 
possible speech could further be restricted through the adoption of these 
types of arguments by courts, or even through more aggressive policing 
in this area by trademark holders. 
A final concern I would like to address that stems from lowering the 
burden of proof for fame is the harm to business competition.  This is 
sometimes an overlooked concern when discussing the enlargement of 
trademark rights, as more serious concerns to society can take form in 
the loss of our rights to freely express ourselves.  No less important, 
however, is the ability of businesses (of all sizes) to freely compete in 
our consumer-oriented marketplace.  In fact, ensuring that all businesses 
have the ability to compete fairly is a goal of trademark law, which is a 
species of unfair competition law.186  A number of scholars, including 
myself, have argued that trademark rights can be used to stifle 
competition by large entities.187  Professor Rosemary Coombe has 
stated that “[p]rotecting consumers from potential confusion becomes 
the ruse by which corporations protect themselves from 
competition.”188  In addition, I have argued that small businesses, which 
are uniquely susceptible to claims of trademark infringement, are the 
entities that often provide competition to large and established 
businesses.189  Lowering the burden of proof for fame would provide 
large entities the ability to exclude other businesses, particularly small 
 
183. See Ramsey, supra note 20, at 1097 (“A descriptive mark is a word, name, or symbol 
used to indicate a brand of product or service that also describes the qualities or characteristics of 
the product or service sold under that mark.”). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 1099–100 (footnote omitted). 
186. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916). 
187. Grinvald, supra note 176, at 436. 
188. ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: 
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 66 (1998). 
189. Grinvald, supra note 176, at 436 (“In the marketplace, it is often the small businesses and 
individuals who provide competition to the established businesses in any particular industry, 
often by offering cheaper or cutting-edge alternatives.”). 
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ones, from utilizing the same or similar marks to sell products that 
compete directly with the large entity.  In the end, consumers are the 
ones who are harmed, as competition is typically the best way of 
lowering high prices and ensuring robust consumer choice.190 
*** 
In conclusion, the combination of a theoretical disconnect with the 
serious consequences that stem from lowering the burden of proof for 
trademark fame supports an argument mitigating against the importation 
of the objective theory of contracting into trademark law.  I readily 
acknowledge, however, that there could be some criticisms of my 
concerns and I briefly address these potential criticisms in the next 
Section. 
C.  Potential Criticisms 
There are a number of potential criticisms to my concerns over 
importing the objective theory of contracting into trademark law.  I will 
address two of those concerns in this Section: (1) that I might be 
worrying over nothing, and (2) that notwithstanding the theoretical 
disconnect, importing the objective theory may make trademark 
infringement cases more efficient. 
1.  Worry Over Nothing? 
I admit that my worry over importing the objective theory of 
contracting into trademark law may be for naught.  After all, there are 
not that many cases where courts have used offline or online agreements 
to prove trademark distinctiveness.  It could be that judges are quite 
capable of distinguishing between arguments to use online agreements 
to prove fame and the use of total website users.  As I acknowledged 
earlier, in such a situation, it is likely that a judge is not importing the 
objective theory of contracting if she is looking at the use of total 
website users, particularly for dominant marks that appear on the 
website.191  Nonetheless, I believe my concerns are justified for two 
reasons: the tendency of trademark holders to attempt to enforce non-
dominant and portions of their dominant marks, and the alluring nature 
of using contracts as evidence. 
 
190. For example, in the market of dog accessories, Haute Diggity Dog was able to produce 
chewable dog toys called “Chewy Vuiton” for a price of $10 each, whereas Louis Vuitton sells 
dog accessories costing approximately $1,600.  Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity 
Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 268 (4th Cir. 2007);  see Peter Lattman, “Chewy Vuiton” Beats Louis 
Vuitton, But Feels a Bite, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Nov. 28, 2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
2006/11/28/chewy-vuiton-beats-louis-vuitton-but-feels-a-bite/. 
191. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Flipboard case). 
15_GRINVALD FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2016  1:32 PM 
2016] Contracting Trademark Fame? 1327 
First, large trademark holders have recently been attempting to 
enforce non-dominant marks, as well as portions of their dominant 
marks.  Two good examples of this are the enforcement strategies of 
Facebook and Amazon.192  I have peppered this Article with references 
to Facebook’s enforcement of “Book” against all types of online 
entities.193  This enforcement occurs informally through cease-and-
desist letters, as well as formally through federal litigation and 
oppositions brought at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.194  In 
addition, this enforcement occurs against all types of uses of the word 
“Book,” even where the alleged infringer argues that its use is in a 
generic or descriptive sense.195  A recent example of this is Facebook’s 
opposition against the term “DesignBook,” which was inspired by the 
design books that the founders of a startup used in engineering 
school.196  With respect to Amazon, their trademark enforcement 
strategy appears largely focused on oppositions at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, with their objections to other applicants’ marks 
based on their non-dominant “Whisper” mark.197 
Second, it is likely very enticing to a judge to utilize contracts as 
evidence.  In the realm of the types of evidence admissible in federal 
court, contracts are considered to be admissible documents and not 
inadmissible hearsay.198  As the Ninth Circuit has held, “a written 
contract . . . memorializes the fact of a legal agreement . . . [and] falls 
outside the definition of hearsay.”199  Other appellate courts have held 
likewise.  In fact, in a copyright infringement lawsuit, the Fifth Circuit 
 
192. Jon Brodkin, Facebook Asserts Trademark on Word “Book” in New User Agreement, 
ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 23, 2012 1:20 PM); US PTO, TTABVUE, http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ 
(search “Amazon” in “Party” for search results that include oppositions brought against 
applications for the mark “Whisper”). 
193. See, e.g., Facebook 2013 TOS, supra note 10. 
194. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com, LLC, 819 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
26, 2011); see also Robin Wauters, Hey Facebook, Here are Some Other Companies you can 
Bully or Sue, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 26, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/26/facebook-
placebook-teachbook/. 
195. See AJ Dellinger, Facebook Bullies Startup Over Name Trademark, DAILY DOT (June 4, 
2015, 11:16 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/facebook-designbook-trademark/; 
Tiffany R. Johnson, Facebook Is Accepting No Friend Requests: Trademark of “Generic Plus” 
Words Makes Fast Adversaries, J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. (Oct. 30, 2010), http://ipjournal. 
law.wfu.edu/2010/10/facebook-is-accepting-no-friend-requests-trademark-of-generic-plus-words-
makes-fast-adversaries/. 
196. Joe Mullin, Facebook Sics Trademark Lawyers on “Designbook” Startup, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 2, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/06/facebook-sics-
trademark-lawyers-on-designbook-startup/. 
197. See Brodkin, supra note 192. 
198. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
199. United States v. Bellucci, 995 F.2d 157, 161 (9th Cir. 1993). 
15_GRINVALD FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2016  1:32 PM 
1328 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
held that the defendant’s objection to the admission of a licensing 
agreement based on hearsay grounds was unfounded.  The court stated: 
The objection was—in fact—inapposite. . . . Under the objective 
theory of contracts, the fact that two parties signed a contract is 
enough to create legal rights, whatever the signatories might have 
been thinking when they signed it.  The admission of a contract to 
prove the operative fact of that contract’s existence thus cannot be the 
subject of a valid hearsay objection.200 
2.  More Efficient Resolution of Trademark Litigation Suits? 
A second criticism or argument against my thesis that the objective 
theory of contracting should not be imported into trademark law is that 
such importation could actually lead to more efficient resolutions of 
infringement lawsuits.  Online agreements could serve as probative 
evidence to shortcut the fact-heavy analysis that courts are currently 
required to undertake in trademark infringement litigation.  This could 
make trademark litigation more efficient because currently parties to the 
suit need to submit high volumes of evidence to prove fame.  
Correspondingly, courts need to sift through and analyze such evidence, 
which makes trademark litigation fairly inefficient. 
The use of online agreements as evidence of fame could be akin to a 
bright-line rule because under the objective theory the court would not 
have to question the validity of the trademark acknowledgement.  The 
problem with this argument is that courts have routinely rejected bright-
line rules in trademark litigation, unless they are provided for in the 
federal trademark statute.201  For example, the Supreme Court in 
Qualitex overturned a lower court’s ruling that colors could never be 
considered distinctive.202  Instead, the Court held that “no special legal 
rule prevents color alone from serving as a trademark.”203  In addition, 
the gains in efficiency that could be achieved from using contracts as 
stand-alone evidence of fame would be small, compared to the likely 
high levels of inaccuracies that would occur.  These inaccuracies would 
be where courts find fame for generic or merely descriptive terms based 
on this evidence.  Therefore, it is unlikely that an efficiency argument 
could serve as a stand-alone reason to import the objective theory of 
contracting into trademark law. 
 
200. Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, 12 F.3d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 1994). 
201. See, e.g., Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985) (holding 
that the Lanham Act’s incontestability provision meant that an incontestable mark could not be 
challenged based on being merely descriptive because of the text of the federal trademark law). 
202. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 160 (1995). 
203. Id. at 161. 
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IV.  SOME SOLUTIONS 
Although I have argued against the importation of the objective 
theory of contracting into trademark law, I do recognize that courts may 
be tempted to utilize online agreements as evidence of fame.  Based on 
this, I advance two proposals that could assist in overcoming the 
importation of the objective theory while utilizing online agreements as 
evidence of fame.  The first is to scrutinize the online agreements 
carefully and the second is to adopt an “interactive theory” of 
distinctiveness.  I will discuss each in turn. 
A.  Scrutinize Agreements Carefully 
My first proposal is not ground breaking, but builds upon what judges 
already do in contract dispute cases, namely, scrutinize the online 
agreements entered into evidence very carefully.  Typically, parties to a 
contract dispute will first argue over formation of the contract.204  
Based on the objective theory of contracting, it is highly unlikely that a 
court would find a lack of contract formation.205  The next step after 
finding that the parties entered into a binding contract is to interpret the 
terms in dispute.206 
As such, I encourage courts that will be faced with such evidence to 
look at the terms of the online agreement and understand what the terms 
are attempting to do.  For example, based on my categorization of these 
terms in Part III, I would encourage courts to scrutinize very carefully 
contracts that fall into category one, contracts where the trademark 
provision has a list of specific marks.  If faced with this type of 
provision, I would encourage the court to question which trademarks are 
being asserted in the litigation and whether website users encounter 
such marks in any place on the website other than in the online 
agreement.  If the answer is in the negative, or the marks are very rarely 
encountered, then I would encourage the court to not provide any 
probative weight to such an agreement.  An example of this is 
Amazon’s “Whisper” mark, which is listed on Amazon’s “non-
exhaustive” list of 462 trademarks, but does not appear on any of the 
main pages of its website.207  In fact, one has to search for the very 
specific “WhisperSync” mark in order to obtain any results.208 
 
204. See, e.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 235 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (addressing 
arguments of contract formation before interpretation). 
205. Moringiello, supra note 46, at 1320. 
206. See, e.g., Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d, at 239–44 (analyzing the contract’s terms for 
unconscionability after deciding the formation question). 
207. Amazon TOS, supra note 2. 
208. See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
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B.  Adopt an “Interactive” Theory of Fame 
My second proposal is more wide ranging, and is also intended to 
assist in the use by courts of website user numbers (even if divorced 
from the online agreements, as seen in the Flipboard case).  I propose 
that courts adopt an “interactive” theory of trademark distinctiveness.  
This theory is intended to capture the analysis that courts are already 
undertaking in distinctiveness, which is the connection between the 
mark and consumers.209  However, this theory provides more concrete 
guidance to courts when undertaking this analysis.  Although I have 
previously argued that this theory could assist in determining when a 
trademark has reached “well-known” mark status, I believe that it is 
equally applicable to the broader question of distinctiveness.210 
The main thrust of the interactive theory of distinctiveness is that 
consumers learn to recognize trademarks as source identifiers, and then 
as famous marks, through direct experiences with the mark.211  As I 
have noted elsewhere, manufacturers already recognize this method of 
cognitive learning of trademarks and have adjusted their marketing 
campaigns accordingly.212  For example, one of the touted methods of 
promoting a new product (and hence its trademark) is to provide 
product giveaways.213  By providing the actual product to consumers to 
experience, manufacturers are initiating a direct experience between the 
consumer and the product, which raises the possibility of trademark 
recognition.214 
The interactive theory is equally applicable to the online context, 
where users are initiating direct experiences with websites they visit or 
applications they use on their smartphones or tablets.  The more users 
are forced to interact with a particular trademark through clicking, the 
more likely it is that they will recognize the trademarks that they 
 
209. Greene & Wilkerson, supra note 11, at 555. 
210. See generally Grinvald, supra note 11. 
211. Id. at 45. 
212. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Interactivity, Territoriality, and Well-Known Marks, in 
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 45–46 
(Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 2014) (“[T]rademark holders are already cognizant of this 
evolution in the manner of gaining consumer recognition: think of all of the ‘sampling’ that is 
done at grocery stores, or ‘free samples’ of products that are given away at fairs or festivals.”). 
213. See, e.g., Steve Olenski, 5 Inexpensive Ways to Promote a Product Launch, FORBES 
(Oct. 14, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolenski/2014/10/14/5-inexpensive-
ways-to-promote-a-product-launch/. 
214. See Frank R. Kardes et al., Construal-Level Effects on Preference Stability, Preference-
Behavior Correspondence, and the Suppression of Competing Brands, 16 J. CONSUMER 
PSYCHOL. 135, 137 (2006) (citing three previous studies, and finding: “[p]rior research has shown 
that direct (vs. indirect) experiences with an object are likely to lead to the spontaneous formation 
of strong attitudes that are highly accessible in memory.”). 
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encounter on the sites or applications.  Courts should adopt this theory 
when analyzing the evidence presented to prove any level of 
distinctiveness on the spectrum, whether it is secondary meaning, 
strength, or fame.  In particular, courts could require that plaintiffs 
provide web analytic-type evidence to prove the amount of time users 
are spending with particular parts of the website, how often they are 
clicking on links that include the site’s claimed trademarks, and so 
forth.215  This type of evidence does not need to be to the exclusion of 
other relevant evidence, such as progression of sales over the time 
period of the mark’s use, but could help shed more insight into how 
consumers really perceive the trademark at issue.  Adoption of this 
theory would provide guidance to courts in an area that is extremely 
difficult to navigate. 
CONCLUSION 
The fields of contract law and trademark law overlap in significant 
ways: without the certainty of contracting, it is likely that trademarked 
goods and services would not be freely traded.  Therefore, it may be 
tempting to blindly accept at face value that a theory that appears to 
work well in contract law could work equally as well in trademark law.   
My goal of this Article has been to show that before we import a theory 
from one area of the law into another, we should more consciously 
question such importation.  In this Article, I focused on the question of 
importing one specific theory of contract law into trademark law, but 
the questioning should be applied to other fields of law and other 
theories.  In particular, the questioning should focus on the “fit” of the 
imported theory with existing theories, as well as the consequences that 
could flow from such importation. 
With respect to the importation of the objective theory of contracting 
into trademark law, I have argued against such importation.  My main 
two arguments are based on the theoretical disconnect, in addition to 
serious real-life consequences, that would flow from such importation.  
Given that the utilization of user and download numbers are a tempting 
shortcut for difficult decisions regarding trademark fame, I have offered 
two proposals to assist decision makers, including the adoption of an 
interactive theory of trademark fame.  My proposals are non-exhaustive 
and it is my hope that this Article will simply highlight this as a 
problem to take seriously and start a discussion of how to resolve it. 
 
215. See generally AVINASH KAUSHIK, WEB ANALYTICS 2.0: THE ART OF ONLINE 
ACCOUNTABIITY & SCIENCE OF CUSTOMER CENTRICITY (2010) (defining web analytics and 
arguing for better use of such data). 
